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Institutional Ethics Committees: Should We Kill All
the Lawyers?
The Role of Lawyers on Hospital Ethics
Committees
JoannaK Weinberg,J.D., LL.AM
I.

INTRODUCTION

Lawyers who serve on hospital ethics committees frequently find
themselves wondering what precisely the role of law is in resolving ethical
dilemmas, how law affects the functioning of hospital ethics committees,
and what non-lawyer colleagues on these committees think lawyers ought
to be doing.
This article explores the role of lawyers on institutional ethics
committees, and whether the presence of lawyers on institutional ethics
committees affects the form or content of the committee's discourse or
activities. This question, of course, immediately raises several normative
questions: what is the purpose of institutional ethics committees, what do
they do, where did they come from, and who selects the members?
The idea of asking a group of people not directly involved with a
patient's care to advise the patient's physicians about ethical issues is a very
recent phenomenon and is still in its adolescence.' But it is an awkward
adolescence, without clear rules or direction. The "accepted wisdom" is
that institutional ethics committees were established for the purpose of
assisting physicians in resolving complicated ethical problems involving the
2
care and treatment of patients within the healthcare institution. Their
decisions are, for the most part advisory. But despite the endorsement of
the formal medical establishment,3 they are frequently not welcomed within
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their own facilities. It is not clear why institutional ethics committees have
evolved the way they have, as quasi-professional bodies composed chiefly
of medically oriented members. An early example suggests what "might
have been."
II.

THE "BIRTH OF BIOETHICS": THE SEATTLE SWEDISH HOSPITAL "GOD
COMMITTEE"

In 1961, Seattle Swedish Hospital's Artificial Kidney Center formed a
proto-ethics committee, an Admissions and Policy Committee, to assist the
medical staff make recommendations as to which patients should receive a
then-new form of kidney dialysis which greatly expanded the number of
patients who could benefit from receiving hemodialysis, far beyond the
limited capacity of the hospital's center.
The hospital created the
committee in part to protect doctors from having to make these decisions
about their own patients.
The committee, later termed the "God Committee," was composed of
seven lay members - a lawyer, a minister, a housewife, a state government
official, a banker, a labor leader, and a surgeon who served as a "doctorcitizen". It met every two weeks for four years. Journalist Shana
Alexander received permission to attend some of the Committee's meetings
and discussed their debates in a 1962 Life magazine article. She said of the
Committee "[t]hese seven citizens are in fact a Life or Death Committee.
With no moral or ethical guidelines save their own individual consciences,
they must decide, in the words of the Hebrew prayer, 'Who shall live and
who shall die; who shall attain the measure of man's days and who shall not
attain it; who shall be at ease and who shall be afflicted.' They do not much
like the job."
At the outset the Committee had to decide whether it should accept the
recommendation of the kidney doctors at the hospital, that patients over
forty-five and children should be excluded on the grounds that they were
most likely to suffer other health problems that could compromise their
dialysis - the committee did. Ultimately, the committee created its own list
of criteria, an extensive list based upon age, sex, marital status and number
of dependents, income, net worth, emotional stability, educational
The Age Of Transparency, HUM. RTs., Fall 2007, at 10, 10 (citing the 1992 mandate of the
Joint Commission - then the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations ("JCAHO") - that healthcare facilities should have in place a mechanism for
the consideration of ethical issues that arise in the course of patient care).
4.

Shana Alexander, Thirty Years Ago, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Nov./Dec. 1993, at S5.

5. Shana Alexander, They Decide Who Lives, Who Dies, KIDNEY TIMES (Mar. 2011),
http://kidneytimes.com/article_
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background, occupation, past history and future potential, and names of
people who could serve as references. The Committee also limited
eligibility to residents of Washington State. Subsequent analysis of the
Committee's selections over the four years showed that those with the best
chance for acceptance by the committee were white middle aged, middle
class men, not surprising since all members of the committee were middle
class white men, with the exception of the "housewife" (who was married
to a middle class white man).
The Committee struggled with how to determine the standards that
should be employed in making its decisions.
HOUSEWIFE: If we are still looking for the men with the highest
potential of service to society, I think we must consider that the chemist

and the accountant have the finest educational backgrounds of all five
candidates.
LAWYER: Both these men have made provisions so that their deaths will
not force their families to become a burden on society.
SURGEON: How do the rest of you feel about Number Three-the small
businessman with three children? I am impressed that his doctor took
special pains to mention that this man is active in church work. This is an
indication to me of character and moral strength.
HOUSEWIFE: Which certainly would help him conform to the demands
of the treatment ....
LAWYER: It would also help him endure a lingering death ....
STATE OFFICIAL: But that would seem to be placing a penalty on the
very people who have perhaps been most provident ....
MINISTER: And both of these men have children too.
LABOR LEADER: For the children's sake, we've got to reckon with the
surviving parents opportunity to remarry, and a woman with three
children has a better chance to find a new husband than a very young
widow with six children. 6
This is only a small fragment of the committee's deliberations, but it is
unnerving. What was the committee's charge? Were they presented with a
clear definition of ethical decision-making, or were they simply told to
devise their own standards for determining eligibility?
Were their
recommendations advisory or determinative; in effect, did they have the
authority of a jury? Was the patient or family involved in the committee's

deliberations, and was there an opportunity for the patient or family to
appeal the committee's decision, or to present evidence? Finally, it seems
clear that only patients who had traditional support systems were
considered; there were no patients who might need assistance from

6.

Id
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surrogate or any form of long term care in order to continue their dialysis
treatments.
What was the lawyer's role on this committee? He didn't "act like a
lawyer;" he didn't raise issues one would expect a lawyer to raise. In fact,
his comments might be said to have violated a lawyer's obligations as an
officer of the courts, except that in this case the committee debates appear
to have been more those like of a jury - confidential, only made public
following the "verdict," due to the presence of a reporter.
The Life magazine article spawned an NBC television documentary,
which highlighted the stories of some of the successful recipients.7 A small
town in Washington raised $30,000 for a young milkman. The "Bucks for
Buddy" campaign included pancake breakfasts, bake sales, and a radio
announcer's daily pitches for support. Another recipient, after discussing
his dialysis, was asked if he knew what happened to the other applicants for
the kidney machine. He replied, "'[O]nly two of us were accepted.. . . I
don't know why [the others were rejected]-either for medical reasons or
psychological reasons or [they] just didn't have the $30,000.'"' When
asked if he knew what happened to the others, he replied, "They're dead."9
The "God Committee" has been disparaged; it was not really an ethics
committee, but a rationing committee of laypersons, using social worth
criteria to make its decisions. However, the outcome of the Seattle affair
was not an immediate shift to institutional ethics committees, at least not
with respect to disputes about end-of-life care and distribution of scarce
medical resources. The outcome was a shift to rationing under a different
guise. Perhaps in response to the negative reaction of the public, discussions
about dialysis moved inside the institution to become less visible, often
only among physicians, excluded laypersons (and lawyers) and became less
specific about the process of and reasons for their decisions.10 The facilities
still considered personal details, but these became part of the medical
judgment. The economically disadvantaged and those with an "unsavory"
past were not considered a good risk for dialysis because they did not have
the emotional support of stable families. Subsequent allocation methods
included administration of IQ, personality, and vocational tests; lotteries
(from a medically acceptable pool), and first-come first-served, premised
upon the utilitarian principle of "maximizing outcome"."
The "God Committee" has frequently been cited as the case that led to
7.

Sally T. Sanford, What Scribner Wrought, 13 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT.337, 344 (2010).

8. Id. at 345.
9. Id.
10. Sally L. Satel & Benjamin E. Hippen, When Altruism Is Not Enough: The Worsening
Organ Shortage and What it Meansfor the Elderly, 15 ELDER L.J. 153, 171 (2007).
11. Id.
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the "birth" of ethics committees. It is also set off a chain of events that led
to a significant advance in health law. The 1972 amendments to the Social
Security Act created the End State Renal Disease Program, ending the need
for decisions about allocation of dialysis technology and making dialysis
universally available under Medicare, without consideration as to age,
income or medical condition.12
With respect to the "birth" of "bioethics" and ethics committees, the
credit falls somewhere between law, medicine and philosophy. Albert
Jonsen suggests that it does not much matter, "[w]hether [the] birthday [of
ethics committees] was November 9, 1962, the date of the Life article about
the Seattle committee, or June 16, 1966, the day [Henry] Beecher's article
on the ethics of research appeared in the [New England Journal of
Medicine], or March, 31 1976, when the New Jersey Supreme Court
rendered its decision In the Matter of Karen Ann Quinlan, all these events
pushed medical ethics out of its past into its future."l 3 Nor does it matter
whether bioethics was conceived "in the inspiration that struck Dan
Callahan and Will Gaylin in 1969 to start The Hastings Center and, almost
simultaneously, struck Andre Hellegers to start the Kennedy Institute for
Bioethics in Georgetown, the ideas for bioethics were waiting to be

heard."l 4
III.

FROM RATIONING COMMITTEES TO ETHICS COMMITTEES -NOT A
GREAT LEAP

However, many people consider the New Jersey Supreme Court's
decision in In re Quinlan to have given institutional ethics committees an
official stamp of approval. Ethics committees began to move into the
mainstream following that court's opinion. Quinlan involved a father's
request to remove his daughter from life support, a young women whom all
physicians agreed was in a permanent vegetative state following a drug
overdose. The court held that Quinlan's father had the right to act as her
surrogate decision maker and to direct the actions of her physicians. In its
opinion, the court noted the years of contentious litigation and expressed its
It was "impossibly
frustration at the lengthy adversarial process.
cumbersome" for the courts to be involved in patient care decision making,
said the court, suggesting that an ethics committee within the health facility
would more effectively and knowledgeably act as an alternative to the more

12. Social Security Amendment of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 2991 (1972).
13. Albert R. Jonsen, The Birth of Bioethics, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Nov./Dec., 1993, at
S1, S3 (citing Henry Beecher, Special Article, Ethics and Clinical Research, N.Eng. J. Med.,
24; 274, 1354-1360)
14. Id.
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traditional probate court process.15
The Quinlan court recognized the failure of the adversarial process in
ethical disputes over patient care. As courts often do, it is likely that the
Quinlan court picked up on a nascent trend in medical society, a frustration
with increasing disputes over medical decision-making, and the emergence
of the field of medical ethics (the seminal work on the topic is The
Principles of Biomedical Ethics16 by Thomas Beauchamp and James
Childress). As a result, institutional ethics committees have become nearly
universal since Quinlan, and are now required by a number of official
bodies.' 7 The only membership requirement is diversity; members must
come from a variety of disciplines and theoretical backgrounds, and must
be representative of the local community.s
In 1998, over ninety percent of U.S. hospitals had ethics committees,
compared to just one percent in 1983.19 In many institutions, physicians
20
have been unenthusiastic about the presence of ethics committees.
However, the American Medical Association Code of Ethics suggests that
"[p]referably, a majority of the committee should consist of physicians,
nurses, and other health care providers," 2 1 and this is how most institutional
ethics committees are composed at present, with most additional members
also drawn from the facility - social workers, chaplains, and occasionally
institution administrators.
Institutional ethics committees' duties have also evolved. Initially their
duties primarily involved clinical consultation, advising treating physicians
and families about treatment options and assisting in resolving disputes
over patient treatment and care. Gradually they began to take on a policy
function as well; to review and draft institutional policies that touch on
issues of ethics, and more recently, to provide training in core ethics
competencies to institutional committee members.22 However, they struggle
with somewhat incompatible goals - to make the process of consultation
and consideration of ethical issues less adversarial and to bring tough
15.

In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).

16.

THOMAS BEAUCHAMP & JAMES CHILDRESS, THE PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS

(Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (1979).
17.

PAT MILMOE MCCARRICK, ETHICS COMMITTEES IN HOSPITALS 1-2 (1992),

available

at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/publications/scopenotes/sn3.pdf.
18.

JCAHO, COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 104 (1992).

19. Glenn McGhee et al., A NationalStudy ofEthics Committees, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Fall
2011, at 60, 62.
20. Bernard Lo, Behind Closed Doors: Promises and Pitfalls of Ethics Committees, 317
N. ENG. J. MED. 46 (1987) ("The committee may feel attacked by various groups [including]
attending physicians who fear that their power is being usurped.").
21.

AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, supra note 2.

22.

McGhee et al, supra note 19, at 60.
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decisions into the open.
IV. THE ROLE OF LAWYERS
Lawyers have been members of institutional ethics committees from the
beginning, although only a minority of institutional ethics committees has a
lawyer as a member. Most are appointed as community members, although
occasionally legal representatives of the institution or risk managers are
members.
Despite the history, the role of law and lawyers on ethics committees has
been controversial. Do (or should) lawyers bring a particular expertise to
ethics committees, or should they behave like the lawyer on the Seattle
"God Committee" - like just another member of the community? What role
should lawyers play in the training of institutional ethics committee
members?
For example, consider the following hypothetical dilemma. An
institutional ethics committee in a community hospital was asked to give an
advisory opinion about an experimental in vitro fertilization procedure
proposed by a physician-owner of a local fertility clinic. The physician did
not request the participation of the hospital; he simply wanted the input of
the ethics committee as to what ethical issues he could expect. However,
the description of the project was framed as a "proposal." The committee
was composed of various members of the hospital staff including
physicians, nurses, and a social worker, three community members,
including a lawyer, and was chaired by two staff members - a physician
and a hospital chaplain. It also had a paid ethics consultant. Prior to the
meeting, the ethics consultant distributed a lengthy analysis of the fertility
physician's proposal. The committee engaged in a lengthy discussion of
the ethical issues, led by the ethics consultant, but the lawyer felt that there
were significant legal issues as well, and wished to include those in the
discussion.
What should the outcome be? The ethics consultant felt the purpose of
the discussion was solely to address the ethical issues, and that the legal
issues would divert attention from the serious ethical concerns. The lawyer
felt that the committee needed to have all of the relevant information, legal
as well as ethical, in order to address the issue in a coherent way.
This highlights a key conflict over how institutional ethics committees
view their role in clinical ethics consultation - one that is exclusively
ethical, regardless of individual members' disciplinary training, or one that
draws on committee members' individual expertise as contributors to an
ethical discourse and seeks multidisciplinary perspectives.
The emergence of professional bioethicists and ethics consultants have
raised the bar for what constitutes training, as has the report defining the

Published by LAW eCommons, 2012

7

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 21 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 17

188

Annals of Health Law - ASLME Special Edition

[Vol. 21

Core Competencies for Health Care Ethics Consultation, initially adopted
by the Association for Bioethics and Humanities in 2008 and revised in
The focus on core competencies shifted the direction of
2010.23
institutional ethics committee discourse in the direction of requiring that all
members have formal training in ethics consultation. To its credit, the
report does not take a position on whether professionally trained bioethics
consultants, or institutional ethics committees should perform ethics
consultations.24
The report defines the nature and goals of ethics consultation, the types
of skills, knowledge and character traits important for conducting ethics
consultations, and the special obligations of consultants. 25 Individuals
engaged in healthcare ethics consultation ("HCEC") should be able to
access, critically evaluate, and use relevant knowledge in the following
concepts:
*Moral reasoning and ethical theory as it relates to HCEC
*Common bioethical issues and concepts that typically emerge in
HCEC
*Health care systems
eClinical context as it relates to HCEC
*The local health care institution in which the consultant (or
committee member) works
*The local health care institution's policies relevant for HCEC
*The beliefs and practices of the local patient and staff population
*The relevant codes of ethics and professional conduct and
guidelines of accrediting organizations; and
*Relevant health care law.26
There is little doubt that all, or at least most, institutional ethics
committee members should have an effective grasp of the concepts
contained in items two through eight. It is also likely that most institutional
staff that serves on committees should receive basic training in these
concepts, although many of them will already have a basic understanding.
It is less clear whether the more esoteric concepts of moral reasoning and
ethical theory require precise, explicit training, or whether patients and
physicians may be better served when institutional committee members
contribute the moral principles and ethical perspectives of their own
23.
AM. Soc'Y FOR BIOETHICS & HUMANITIES, CORE COMPETENCIES FOR HEALTH CARE
ETHICS CONSULTATION (2010).

24.

Frederick Adolf Paola, Law, Humanities and Equipoise in the Education of

Physicians Assistants, INTERNET J. ALLIED HEALTH SCI. & PRAC., Apr. 2006, at 1, 2,

http://ijahsp.nova.edu/articles/vol4num2/paola.pdf
25. AM. SoC'Y FOR BIOETHICS & HUMANITIES, supra note 23, at 22-33.
26. Id. at 27.

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol21/iss1/17

8

Weinberg: Institutional Ethics Committees: Should We Kill All the Lawyers -

2012] Insitutional Ethics Committees: Should We Kill All Lawyers?

189

disciplines.
Looking at the three key functions of institutional ethics committees clinical consultation, bioethics education, and policy development, lawyers
have been involved in institutional policy development ever since
institutions began to develop policies, since policies are generally reviewed
by institutional legal staff before final approval. But does it make sense for
lawyers to participate in policy-making or advising on policy through their
participation on institutional ethics committees as well? All policies should
comply with legal requirements relating to the topic under consideration,
especially since many issues involve legislation, regulations, or official
policies. If an institutional ethics committee is asked to assist the institution
in drafting an institutional policy, for example a Physician Order for Life
Sustaining Treatment ("POLST") form, what should be the role of a
lawyer-member of the ethics committee? Institutional policies are generally
reviewed by institution administration, often including an institution
attorney, before final approval. What does the committee lawyer-member
contribute that is different? Consider the other two functions of the
institutional ethics committee - ethics consultation, and staff, and now,
committee education. With respect to all three ethics committee functions,
the lawyer-member can provide the basic knowledge of the law - one of the
Core Competencies relevant to bioethics consultation (e.g., end-of life
decision making, competency, informed consent, privacy). 27 Non-lawyers
can acquire general legal knowledge; however, the lawyer-member has the
advantage of recognizing that the law in its "black letter" context may
interpret similar concepts differently.28 Lawyers can explain how legal
concerns might impact ethical analyses, not just "black-letter" law, but legal
perspectives of ethical issues such as informed consent, confidentiality, and
futility. The expanded framework can provide the committee with useful
tools for ethical analysis.29
This argument frames the discourse in favor of including lawyers as
community members on institutional ethics committees, and it suggests that
it may not be wise to delegate all training of members of committee
members to bioethics consultants, or to turn over all ethics consultation to
professional ethics consultants. (Lawyers employed by the institution have
different interests altogether).
The core competencies explicitly include education in relevant health
care law as one of the competencies. Who should provide this education?
Perhaps it is sufficient if some members of the committee (whether or not a

27. Id.
28. Amy L. McGuire et al., The Ethics of Lawyer-Ethicists, 33 J.L.
605 (2005).
29. Id.
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lawyer) take on this role. Or should only lawyers (whether committee
members or not) be the "educator" whose role is to "teach" the non-lawyer
members about the law and the legal issues involved in ethical decisionmaking? And it adds a further question - what should be the content of
legal training?
The ethical principles of the Beauchamp and Childress trope are
autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice. 30 The concept of
"justice," for bioethicists, does not always mean due process for the patient,
as that might create an adversarial relationship between patient and
provider. 3 1 However, the point in the article cited above is not that the
conflicting interpretations of due process (legal and ethical) are adversarial
or that legal "due process" is not a "lawyerly enemy of the physician." The
point is that legal and ethical due process, if it were possible to marry the
two, are a tool to guarantee that the patient is heard.32
V.

CONCLUSION

The above discussion suggests that lawyers are appointed to ethics
committees to temper and to balance the tone of ethical discussions.
Looking closely at the issues that ethics committees are struggling with
today, ethical issues in health care have gradually been re-defined as legal
issues. However, who is doing the defining? Does this make it easier or
more difficult to make decisions about these controversies? And are these
things that can be taught to non-lawyers? These questions affect both the
design and functioning of ethics committees, as well how and who should
train ethics committee members.
Institutional ethics committees have taken on a more significant role in
the functioning of institutions since Quinlan, and have expanded to include,
in addition to patient consultation, education - of institution staff and
committee members, and institution policy development. Consultations are
now a key component of bioethical issues in patient care, and the the Core
Competencies have codified most of the skills necessary for a "good"
ethicist." But not enough is known about what legal skills, or legal
knowledge, are necessary, whether the skills can be taught, or whether a
lawyer-ethicist can provide the training "on-site"? That is an issue crying
out for research. In any event, the role of lawyers, still developing, will
become more relevant, clear and important; ideally it will not be long
before the "good" lawyer-ethicist will become widely accepted as an
integral member of institutional ethics committees.
30.
31.
32.

See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 16.
Wolf, supra note 1, at 858.
Id. at 806.
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